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DEPORTATION AND DRIVING: FELONY
DUI AND RECKLESS DRIVING AS CRIMES
OF VIOLENCE FOLLOWING LEOCAL V.
ASHCROFT
I. INTRODUCTION
Every thirty-one minutes, someone is killed in the United States as a
result of an alcohol-related motor vehicle crash.' Because of the high
societal costs, it is hardly surprising that states impose severe penalties for
driving under the influence ("DUI") 2 of alcohol as a method of deterrence.
But how far these penalties can extend has serious implications on other
areas of law; particularly in the arena of immigration law, the classification
of DUI convictions has far-reaching consequences.
Some circuit courts3 have ruled that aliens can be deported for multiple
DUI offenses based on U.S. immigration law,4 stating that aliens can be
removed from the United States for committing an "aggravated felony. 5
An aggravated felony is a "crime of violence" in which the imprisonment
term is at least one year.6 Therefore, whether DUI is a crime of violence
has significant impact on immigration law. Circuit courts that ruled DUI
convictions were deportable offenses based their rulings on the
1 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2003 DATA: -
ALCOHOL (2005), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2003/
809761.pdf.
2 For purposes of simplification within this note, the terms "driving under the influence"
and "driving while intoxicated" are used interchangeably; both are classified as DUI
offenses. This is not to say that there are no instances where the distinction between the
crimes is crucial to the analysis as a crime of violence. However, in the cases analyzed in
this case note, the inquiry involved in each crime is the same, and so the two offenses are
analyzed together.
3 See, e.g., Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); Le v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
4 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, tit. VII, sec. 7000, § 7342, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(2000) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1957).
' 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
6 Id. § l101(a)(43)(F).
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determination that DUI is a crime of violence.7  Other circuit courts
disagreed and held that DUI is not a crime of violence. 8 The Supreme
Court attempted to cure this circuit split in Leocal v. Ashcroft, holding that
DUI is not a crime of violence, and therefore is not an aggravated felony
that warrants deportation. 9
This Note argues that while the Supreme Court reached the proper
decision, it construed the question very narrowly. The Supreme Court
addressed:
Whether, in the absence of a mens rea of at least recklessness with respect to the
active application of force against another, DUI with serious bodily injury is a "crime
of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 that constitutes an "aggravated felony" under § 101
of the [Immigration and Nationality Act]? 10
By answering this question in the negative, the Court made it clear that
DUI convictions absent a mens rea component or with a mens rea of
negligence are not deportable offenses. However, the Court explicitly
refused to address whether an offense with a mens rea of recklessness as to
the use of force against another person or property of another may
constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16.11 By failing to address
this question, the Court did not determine whether felony reckless driving is
a deportable offense, thus leaving much confusion and complication in this
area of law.
Reckless driving, similarly to DUI, is a major societal problem in this
country. It has been estimated that five percent of all motor vehicle
fatalities are due to "[o]perating a vehicle in an erratic, reckless, careless, or
negligent manner.,' 2 This translates to 2,132 of the 42,636 motor vehicle
fatalities each year.
Though this case was recently decided, a potential circuit split has
developed in the classification of reckless driving, an offense closely related
to DUI. Because the term classification has such far-reaching consequences
on aliens and the same reasoning used by courts in excluding crimes with a
mens rea of negligence could have been extended to exclude crimes with a
7 See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1223; Le, 136 F.3d at 1354.
8 See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Chapa-
Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 612 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
9 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2004).
10 Questions Presented, Leocal, 543 U.S. 1 (No. 03-583), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/03-00583qp.pdf.
11 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
12 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT:




mens rea of recklessness, the Court should next determine that intent to use
force is required for a crime of violence. This would exclude both DUI
offenses and a felony reckless driving offense, thus fully curing the
ambiguity in this area of law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Statutory authority for the deportation of legal aliens is derived from
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1957 ("INA"), 13 which grants the
Attorney General the power to initiate deportation proceedings against legal
aliens upon conviction of certain offenses. 14 Initially, the INA authorized
deportation of a legal alien only for commission of a "crime involving
moral turpitude."'15 The statute provides no definition for moral turpitude,
but crimes such as fraud, murder, kidnapping, rape, prostitution, burglary,
and theft have been determined by the courts to be representative. 16 An
alien is subject to this provision if either: 1) at any time within five years
after entry, the crime of moral turpitude is committed and the alien is
imprisoned for any length of time; or 2) at any time after entry, the crime of
moral turpitude is committed and the alien is imprisoned for a year or
more. 17
A. AMENDMENTS TO THE STATUTE
As immigration expanded in the 1980s, reported levels of criminal
activity of aliens arose as well. 18 In response, Congress decided to take a
hard-line approach against criminal aliens and impose harsher punishment.
Their first act was the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
("ADAA"), which expanded the scope of removable offenses by
introducing the "aggravated felony" provision. 19 This new classification,
which serves separately from the crimes of moral turpitude classification as
13 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1778 (2000)) [hereinafter INA]. All existing immigration
laws are incorporated into this statute.
14 "Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A)(iii).
15 Id. § 1227(2)(A)(i).
16 See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d
668 (7th Cir. 2005); Chanmoury v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004).
17 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
18 Craig H. Feldman, Note, The Immigration Act of 1990: Congress Continues to
Aggravate the Criminal Alien, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 209 (1993).
19 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, sec. 7000, § 7341, 102
Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)).
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an independent basis for removal, included only murder, drug trafficking,
and weapons trafficking.20
Congress expanded the aggravated felony list with the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1990 ("Immigration Act").21 The Immigration Act
added additional enumerated crimes to the list of removable offenses; the
most notable addition was the inclusion of any "crime of violence" for
which the term of imprisonment is five years or more.22 The inclusion of
crimes of violence is particularly relevant to this discussion because the
determination of whether DUI is a crime of violence forms the basis of
whether DUI is an aggravated felony rendering the alien criminal subject to
deportation.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), passed in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing,
significantly altered the INA and greatly expanded the types of removable
offenses.23 The AEDPA impacted the aggravated felony definition in two
material ways. First, the AEDPA lowered the sentence requirement of the
24aggravated felony definition. Whereas the determination of an aggravated
felony initially required a sentence of at least five years, crimes carrying a
sentence of only one year could now be classified as aggravated felonies. 5
The second material change was that the AEDPA removed the
requirement that actual incarceration be imposed for determination of an
aggravated felony, making suspended sentences and parole grants irrelevant
to the deportation determination.26 Rather, the AEDPA mandates that as
long as the statute under which the alien is convicted carries a maximum
sentence of at least a year, the offense can be considered an aggravated
felony.27 As a result of the AEDPA amendment to the INA, an aggravated
20 Id.
21 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended
throughout scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22 The Act made it clear that the "crime of violence" would be construed as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 16. Immigration Act of 1990, § 501(a)(2), 104 Stat. 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1 101 (a)(43)(F)).
23 For a discussion of the AEDPA, see generally Ella Din, The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: An Attempt to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments?
38 CATH. LAW. 49 (1998).
24 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 40 1(e),






felony is now a "crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18.
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.,
28
B. CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of violence under is defined as:
i) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the property of another, or
ii) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
29
1. Legislative History
As previously mentioned, the concept of crime of violence as defined
in § 16 was introduced as an aggravated felony for INA purposes in the
Immigration Act. The § 16 definition was adopted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 ("CCCA").3 ° It is important to
examine the legislative history of this act to appropriately determine what
offenses Congress intended to be considered crimes of violence.
The Senate Committee Report ("CCCA Senate Report") noted that
although the term "crime of violence" was occasionally used in other law, it
was previously undefined in the United States Code.31 The origin of the
term "crime of violence" stems from the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedural Act of 1970 ("D.C. Reform Act"), which was
passed fourteen years before the enactment of the CCCA.3 2  The D.C.
Reform Act substantially revised the District of Columbia's criminal code.
One key alteration of the code was in the designation of crimes of violence
as the types of offenses grave enough to entitle a court to order the
detention of defendants before trial proceedings.33  Because specific
offenses were enumerated as crimes of violence under the D.C. Reform Act,
there was no general definition of a crime of violence.34
28 id.
29 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)-(b).
30 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136 (1984).
31 The legislative history document associated with the term "crime of violence" is the
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 19 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3202 [hereinafter CCCA Senate Report].
32 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedural Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-358, 84 Stat. 473, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 551, 764 [hereinafter DC-CRCPA].
33 Id.
34 CCCA Senate Report, supra note 3 1, at 19.
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The CCCA Senate Report recognized that the offenses Congress
intended to include as crimes of violence under § 16 were "essentially the
same" as the types of offenses that the D.C. Reform Act enumerated as
crimes of violence.35 Accordingly, the crimes in the D.C. Reform Act
(which were the types of crime Congress intended to include in § 16)
comprised:
Murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen, taking
or attempting to take immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child under the
age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter,
extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent
to commit any offense, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
offenses, as defined by any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Each of the enumerated offenses denotes conduct requiring specific
intent for commission of the crime.37  The inclusion of voluntary
manslaughter and the exclusion of involuntary manslaughter are particularly
illustrative of this point, as voluntary manslaughter has an intent element
that is lacking for involuntary manslaughter.
38
It is also important to note the inclusion of burglary as a crime of
violence. This is particularly significant to the inquiry of whether DUI is a
crime of violence because many courts have compared the two crimes in
their determination that DUT is not a crime of violence. 39 Those courts have
identified burglary as the type of crime that § 16(b) covers. When a
criminal commits burglary, the criminal is taking a substantial risk that
intentional force may be used in the commission of that crime.4 0 The courts
that have compared the crime of burglary to the crime of DUI have
concluded that the offender must take the risk of intentional force for the
commission of the crime to constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b).4'
Furthermore, the CCCA Senate Report stated that the Judiciary
Committee derived the definition of a crime of violence from a previous bill
by noting that "[t]he definition is taken from [Senate Resolution] 1 6 3 0.,2
35 Id.
36 DC-CRCPA, supra note 32.
37 Intention is "a decision to bring about (the proscribed result] ...... ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 174 (2003).
3 Id. at 293.
39 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243
F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 2001).
40 See, e.g., Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8.
41 Id.; see ASHWORTH, supra note 37, at 394.




Senate Resolution 1630 was considered with House Resolution 6915. 4 3 The
House Resolution is particularly important because it reinforces the idea
that Congress intended the term crime of violence to encompass only
volitional acts. "The term 'physical force' refers to 'physical action'
against another. 'Action,' a variant of the term 'act,' requires affirmative,
volitional behavior."44
2. Definition Under the Sentencing Guidelines
Understanding the definition of a "crime of violence" under the
Sentencing Guidelines is imperative because many courts have examined
this definition in determining whether DUI is a crime of violence under §
6. As a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,46 Congress created
the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines that promote
systematic sentencing procedures as well as uniformity among sentences.47
Additionally, Congress mandated that the Commission promulgate
guidelines that ensure that convictions carry sentences at or near the
maximum term.48
43 Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 19, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (No. 03-583) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-6915,
at 14 (1980)), available at http://www.nysda.org/NYSDAResources/ImmigrantDefense
_Project/04_LeocalAmicusBrief.pdf.
44 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-6915, at 14 (1980)).
4S See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.
2001).
4 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. The Sentencing
Reform Act was Chapter II of the CCCA (the Act that defined a crime of violence under §
16).
41 See S. REP. No. 98-225, supra note 31, at 37-39, 65, 161-62 (1983). For a review of
the development of the Sentencing Commission and the philosophy of the sentencing
guidelines, see generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CiM. L. REv. 19 (2003); Michael E. O'Neill & Linda D. Maxfield, Judicial Perspectives on
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Goal of Sentencing.: Debunking the Myths, 56
ALA. L. REv. 85, 87 (2004).
48 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-69 (1989) (upholding the
constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines).
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at
or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is
eighteen years old or older and -
(1) has been convicted of a felony that is -
(A) a crime of violence ....
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2000).
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In its original form, the Sentencing Reform Act did not define what
constitutes a crime of violence. However, in November 1989, the
Sentencing Commission adopted a definition of a crime of violence for use
in the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. 49 The stated purpose
of the definition was not to create a crime of violence definition separate
from that of § 16, but, rather, to clarify the meaning of § 16's definition.5
The Sentencing Commission defined a crime of violence as:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year that-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or the threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another. 
5 1
Despite the commission's intention, courts have interpreted the
Sentencing Commission's definition of a crime of violence as separate from
§ 16's definition rather than a mere clarification. The § 16 definition
looks only at the use of force, and frames the question as whether actual
force is used or if there is a risk that force will be used.53 On the other
hand, the Sentencing Commission's definition, in addition to looking at the
use of actual force, also focuses on the effect of the offense and frames the
question as whether there is a risk of injury to others.5 4 In fact, courts have
suggested that while DUI would be a crime of violence if the Sentencing
Guidelines' definition were used, since § 16's definition is used, DUI is not
a crime of violence because DUI presents a risk of injury but no risk of
intentional force. 5
49 See United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (1989)).
50 See id. at 865 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (1989)).
51 The Sentencing Guidelines definition was used to determine the career offender
provision. 18 U.S.C. app. § 4B1.2(a) (2000).
52 See, e.g., Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 925-26 (5th Cir. 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600,
607-11 (7th Cir. 2001).
53 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
54 See Parson, 955 F.2d at 865 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C
(1989)).




C. THE PREVIOUS CASE LAW
The previous case history predominately focused on whether DUI is a
crime of violence under § 16(b).56 Despite circuit courts' disagreement
over whether DUI is a crime of violence, there is agreement that the courts
must follow a categorical approach in determining whether an offense
constitutes a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because it
questions the nature of the offense.57 Under this approach, courts looked to
the generic elements of an offense, as opposed to the underlying facts of the
conviction.5 8 "[T]he issue is not whether [the] actual conduct constituted an
aggravated felony, but whether the full range of conduct encompassed by
[the state statute] constitutes an aggravated felony., 59 Although the courts
uniformly applied this approach, different answers emerged.
1. Some Circuit Courts Have Held DUI Is Not a Crime of Violence
These courts found that the inclusion of "use" in § 16's definition of a
crime of violence requires that the offender must risk voluntary use of force
in the furtherance of a crime. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits held
that because a drunk driver does not risk the intentional use of force, DUI is
not a crime of violence. 60 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that a crime of
violence did not require a risk of intentional use of force.6' Instead, if an
offender recklessly risks applying force against another, this force could
constitute a crime of violence.62
a. Second Circuit
Dalton v. Ashcroft63 involved a lawful permanent resident who had
been living in the United States since 1958, before he was one year old.
64
In January 1998, Dalton pleaded guilty to a DUI conviction under New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1192.3.65 Because he had several
previous DUI convictions, his crime and sentence were enhanced under
56 The exception is Le v. U.S. Attorney General, which focused on whether DUI is a
crime of violence under § 16(a). 196 F.3d 1352 (11 th Cir. 1999).
57 Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 606.
58 Id.
59 United States v. Sandoval-Barajas, 206 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2000).
60 Dalton, 257 F.3d 200,followed by, Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2004);
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921; Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d 600.
61 United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
62 Id.
63 Dalton, 257 F.3d at 200.




New York law to a felony carrying a one-and-a-half to four-and-a-half year
sentence. 66 While Dalton was serving his prison sentence, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") began removal proceedings based on 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 67 The Bureau of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
affirmed the immigration judge's removal order, and the Second Circuit
reviewed the BIA's decision.
68
The court noted the numerous ways that the New York drunk driving
statute could be satisfied without intentional actions (such as an intoxicated
individual falling asleep at the wheel of a non-moving vehicle) and found
that conviction under the statute did not require the commission of a per se
crime of violence.69 In determining that DUI is not a crime of violence
under § 16(b), the court focused on the fact that DUI presents the risk of an
accident, but does not risk that the offender will use force in furtherance of
the crime (compared to burglary where an offender takes the risk that he
will need to use force to commit the crime).7° Similar to the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits, the court explored the inclusion of "use" in the statutory
definition and found that it implies an intent requirement not present in DUI
offenses.7 '
Contrary to the government's arguments, the court found that the
difference between the risk of injury and the risk of use of physical force
was dispositive.72 Focusing on the distinction between the Sentencing
Commission's definition and the § 16 definition,73 the court held that the
determination of a crime of violence needs to be predicated on the risk of
the use of force rather than the risk of unintended injury.7 4
b. Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Chapa-Garza, the Fifth Circuit examined the
consolidated appeals of five defendants convicted of unlawful presence in
the United States after removal. 75 The defendants each faced elevated
sentences because their previous convictions on which deportation was
66 Id.
67 "Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000).
6' Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203.
69 Id. at 205-06.
70 Id. at 206.
71 Id. at 206-07.
72 Id. at 207.
73 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
14 Dalton, 257 F.3d at 207-08.
75 United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001).
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predicated were considered aggravated felonies.76 Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, if an offender was previously deported for an aggravated
felony, a sixteen-level increase would be applied to the offender's current
sentence." The court was therefore asked to determine whether a state
drunk driving conviction constituted a crime of violence under § 16(b) as
the basis for an aggravated felony conviction.78
The court based its holding that DUI is not a crime of violence on
three factors. First, determining DUI as a crime of violence under § 16(b)
would require that this provision be interpreted in the same manner as the
much broader definition of a crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines. 79 Noting that § 16(b) was a starting reference point for the
definition under the Sentencing Guidelines, the court further noted that the
numerous amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines' definition made it
inappropriate to construe the definitions in the same manner.80
Second, the court found that in order to satisfy the crime of violence's
requirement that there be a substantial risk that physical force may be
employed, § 16(b)'s definition required that an offender must recklessly
disregard the risk that intentional force may be used.81 Because there is no
disregard of the risk of intentional force in DUI, it cannot be classified as a
crime of violence.82
Finally, the court found that the physical force specified in § 16(b)
refers to the force used in the commission of the offense, not the force that
is a result of the offense.8 3 Because there is no force used in the
commission of DUI, it is not a crime of violence.84
c. Seventh Circuit
In Bazan-Reyes v. INS,85 the Seventh Circuit examined the
consolidated appeals of three resident aliens from INS removal orders based
on state drunk driving convictions under Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin
law.86 The decision that the aliens were appealing held that crimes of
76 Id. at 923.
77 Id.




82 See id. at 927.
83 Id. at 924.
84 Id. at 927.
85 Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2001).
86 Id. at 602-03.
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recklessness, including DUI offenses, are crimes of violence under §
16(b).87
The court rejected the lower decisions of the BIA and the INS. The
court held that DUI is not a crime of violence because § 16(b)'s meaning
requires that an offender risks the intentional use of force, which the court
found was not the case in DUI offenses. 88 The court focused on the mens
rea required to satisfy a crime of violence. The court determined that
offenses with no mens rea component or a mens rea of negligence as to the
risk that intentional physical force be used (as is the case with DUI
offenses) could not be deemed crimes of violence for aggravated felony
purposes. 89 It is interesting to note that the court said that a crime of
violence for aggravated felony purposes could be found, however, in
"crimes in which the offender is reckless with respect to the risk that
intentional physical force will be used in the course of committing the
offense." 90
Applying the categorical approach to the drunk driving statutes, the
court determined that intentional force is not necessary to commit DUI
offenses and thus such offenses could not be deemed crimes of violence. 91
The court, like the Fifth Circuit, looked at the Sentencing Guidelines and
found that while DUI is a crime of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines, crimes of violence under § 16(b) are distinct from those under
the Sentencing Guidelines and should not be interpreted in the same
manner.92 The court followed its precedent that § 16(b)'s inclusion of the
verb "use" implied an intent requirement.93
d. Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, the district court considered
whether a deported alien, who had wrongfully returned to the United States,
should receive an elevated sentence based on his previous DUI conviction.94
The defendant had been convicted and deported for DUI with bodily injury
under California law. 95 The court ruled that his prior conviction did not
satisfy the aggravated felony definition because DUI could not be deemed a
87 Id. at 602.




92 Id. at 610.
" Id. at 611.
94 United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
9' Id. at 1142.
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crime of violence.96 The government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit
examined the district court decision de novo.
9 7
The Ninth Circuit determined that the categorical approach required
that the court use the "ordinary, contemporary, and common" meaning of
the language used in the statute's definition. 98 Focusing on the inclusion of
the word "use" in the statute, the court held that the word as commonly
understood implied a "volitional requirement absent from negligence." 99
The court attempted to reconcile its holding that negligent conduct does not
satisfy § 16(b) with its previous holdings that criminally reckless conduct
satisfies § 16(b)'s definition of a crime of violence. 00 The court said that
intent is not necessary, but a volitional act is. 0 '
In attempting to derive a decision consistent with these previous
holdings, the court turned to the definition of "recklessness" under the
Model Penal Code. 10 2 The court therefore held that recklessness required
that the offender consciously disregard the risk of harm of which the
offender is aware. 10 3 The court found that the conscious disregard of a risk
of harm is a volitional component that is not present in crimes of
negligence, which the court deemed was the mens rea component in the
case at hand. 0 4
Under this analysis, the court is essentially saying that the inclusion of
"use" in the statutory language precludes the classification of crimes with
less than a mens rea of recklessness as a crime of violence because they
lack the necessary volitional component. 0 5 However, it is important to see
that the holding applies to all crimes with a mens rea component of less
than recklessness. 10 6 The court did not construe its holding to apply to only
crimes with a mens rea of less than recklessness as to the risk of actual
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1144.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1146 (discussing Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (validity
questioned but not explicitly overruled)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1145-46.
103 Id. at 1146.
104 As Judge Kozinski notes in the dissent, however, the dangers of drunk driving are
well-known. Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The Trinidad-Aquino court focused on
the negligence that caused the accident and not the recklessness of the drinking and driving
which led to the occurrence of the accident. Id. at 1145.




force being used.10 7  In this manner, the court reinforced the idea that
specific intent to use force is not required for determination of a crime of
violence. 1
08
The Ninth Circuit claimed that while the analysis employed was
different, this decision was consistent with the holdings of the circuit courts
that held that DUI is not a crime of violence.10 9 The court repeatedly
emphasized that under this analysis, a mens rea of at least recklessness is
required for the commission of a crime of violence under the § 16
definition, a holding that was not precluded by the decisions of the other
circuits. 10
It is interesting to consider the dissenting opinion, as it is relevant to
the final analysis explored in Part IV. Judge Kozinski noted his
disapproval, stating that this case cannot be reconciled with the circuit's
precedent that criminal recklessness can satisfy § 16's crime of violence
definition. 11  Because of the precedent case, the court was forced to
recognize that recklessly disregarding a substantial and known risk is
sufficient to satisfy a crime of violence under § 16.112 However, Kozinski
said that the court erred in deciding that the DUI offense does not satisfy
that test. 1 3 The court's error, he suggested, was based on its reliance on the
negligent mens rea as to the occurrence of the accident as opposed to the
recklessness employed in the conduct of drinking and driving.' 14 This issue
will be addressed again in Part IV.
2. Other Circuit Courts Have Held that DUI Is a Crime of Violence
Other courts have held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16.
The Tenth Circuit held that DUI is a crime of violence under § 16(b)
because a drunk driver risks the use of force in the course of committing
this offense." 5 The Eleventh Circuit focused the question differently and





1 " Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
12 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 1147-48 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
115 Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2001).
116 Le v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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crime of violence because physical force is used and therefore satisfies §
16(a)'s definition of crime of violence.' 17
a. Tenth Circuit
The defendant in Tapia Garcia v. INS" 8 received a DUI conviction in
Idaho in 1998. Though released after serving only two months of his five-
year sentence, he became the subject of INS deportation proceedings." 9
The BIA determined that his DUI conviction was a crime of violence and
thus an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
120
The defendant was subsequently deported to Mexico.' 21 The Tenth Circuit
faced the issue of whether Idaho's DUI offense was an aggravated felony
under 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(43)(F), which includes crime of violence as
defined in § 16.122
This court applied Chevron deference to the BIA's removal order.
23
This meant that, because of possible differentiation in the interpretation of §
16(b), the court would defer to the BIA if the interpretation of the statute
that the BIA had presented was reasonable.' 24 The court held that DUI was
a crime of violence because the elements of the offense present a substantial
risk that physical force may be used. 25 The court employed a categorical
approach and refused to examine the particular facts of the defendant's
case. 126 This court neither analyzed the term "use" nor decided whether this
term implied a risk of an intentional forceful act. The court noted the
inherent danger involved in a DUI offense and stated that a drunk driver
risks the use of force in furtherance of the crime, thus satisfying the crime
of violence definition.
27
It is also important to note that this is the only circuit court that used
the Sentencing Guidelines definition to determine that DUI is a crime of
violence. The court relied on federal precedent that held that DUI
"1 Id. at 1354.
118 Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1216.
".. Id. at 1217.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1220.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1222 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984))
121 Id. at 1222-23.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1223.
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In Le v. U.S. Attorney General,129 the court found that DUI is a crime
of violence under § 16(a).' 30 Le, a citizen of Vietnam, was convicted of two
counts of felony for his accident while driving under the influence and with
a suspended license. 131  The BIA determined that his conviction was
grounds for an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. Le appealed the
determination that his DUI conviction was a crime of violence and thus an
aggravated felony. 1
32
In this case, the court held that the BIA's determination that DUI is a
crime of violence was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and
therefore dismissed the petitioner's appeal. 133 The court found that DUI
was a crime of violence because the offense included the actual use of
force. 134 The court focused on the effect of the crime (which includes
force) rather than the risk an offender assumes in the commission of the
crime. 35 This case is particularly important to this Note because the court's
holding forms the basis for the lower court opinion in Leocal.
III. LEOCAL V. ASHCROFT
A. THE FACTS
Josue Leocal, a native citizen of Haiti, arrived in the United States in
1980 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1987.136 Leocal was
married to a U.S. citizen, and they had four children, all of whom were U.S.
citizens.' 37 Prior to the conviction in question, Leocal had been residing in
the U.S. for nineteen years with no criminal record.
1 38
128 Id. at 1222-23.
129 Le v. U. S. Attorney Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
130 Id. at 1353.
131 Id.
132 Id.
131 Id. at 1354.
134 Id.
135 Id.






In 2000, Leocal was convicted of two counts of DUI causing serious
bodily injury in violation of Florida state law. 139 Two individuals were
injured in the accident; one was treated and released at the site of the
accident and the other was transported to a medical center for treatment.
1 40
Leocal was sentenced to two and one-half years of incarceration, and two
and one-half years of probation. 141 During his sentence, Leocal underwent
a ten-month program for alcohol abuse treatment. 142 Leocal served more




The immigration judge said that authority to remove Leocal was
derived from INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 144 for the commission of an
aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F). 145  The INS had
deemed Leocal's conviction for DUI with serious bodily injury under
Florida law 146 a crime of violence under § 16. The immigration judge based
its ruling on the Eleventh Circuit precedent, Le v. Attorney General.
147
Therefore, the immigration judge in the Leocal case likewise held that
Leocal's DUI conviction was a crime of violence warranting Leocal's
removal to Haiti.
48
In his appeal of the BIA decision, Leocal's counsel submitted a
supplemental brief urging the court to reconsider its decision on the basis of
its holding in In re Ramos.149  In Ramos, the BIA concluded that DUI
offenses did not constitute crimes of violence as defined under § 16(b). 50
The opinion also stated, however, that the BIA would continue to follow the
139 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
140 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 136, at 4.
141 Id. at 4.
142 Id. at 5.
143 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 1.
'44 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000); see Leocal, 543 U.S. at
3.
141 INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(f).
146 FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2005).
147 Le v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). As previously noted, the
Le court analyzed the BIA's determination that DUI with serious bodily injury was a crime
of violence and therefore an aggravated felony within the confines of the INA. Id. at 1354.
148 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8.
149 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at la-4a, Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. I (No. 03-583)
(citing In re Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (B.I.A. Apr. 4, 2002) (en banc))
150 Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336.
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precedent in circuit courts that had decided the issue. 15 ' Therefore, in the
Leocal case, the BIA said they were compelled to apply the Le holding and
again affirmed the immigration judge's finding that Leocal's DUI
conviction was a crime of violence. 1
52
Leocal then appealed the BIA decision to the Eleventh Circuit.153 The
court determined that it lacked full authority over the matter based on the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.154
This act limits the judicial review authority over removal decisions.'
55
Therefore, the court could not reexamine the facts of the case in light of
Ramos and solely faced the question of whether the BIA's determination
was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court reviewed the BIA's
interpretation of the INA de novo and deferred to the Board's interpretation
because the court found that interpretation to be reasonable. 156 Therefore,
the court dismissed Leocal's petition for review of the BIA's order for
deportation based on its prior holding and upheld the removal order.
C. MAJORITY OPINION
In Leocal, the Supreme Court unanimously held that state DUI
offenses that either lack a mens rea component or can be satisfied by mere
negligence in the operation of a vehicle are not crimes of violence under §
16.'57 In Leocal, the Court was asked to determine whether DUI is a crime
of violence under § 16(a) because the lower court focused entirely on §
16(a).158 In this analysis, the Court looked to the underlying facts of the
conviction. However, because the wording of both § 16(a) and § 16(b)
include the idea of "use" of force, the analyses of the Court are essentially
the same.
The Court examined § 16(a) and § 16(b) separately and determined
that neither of these provisions are triggered by DUI convictions.
159
Additionally, the Court looked at the ordinary meaning of "crime of
violence" and found that the term refers to violent, active crimes that do not
151 See id.
152 See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 5-6.
153 See id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 149, at 5a-7a).
154 See id. at 6 n.3 (citing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009).
155 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
156 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8.
157 Id. at 15.
's Id. at 5.
"9 Id. at 16-18.
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include DUI offenses. 160  Finally, the Court refrained from addressing
whether an offense requiring reckless use of force against another qualifies
as a crime of violence under § 16.
The Court noted that the language of § 16(a), which defines a crime of
violence as an offense involving "the use ... of physical force against"
another's person or property, suggests the use of active employment of
force. 161 The Court noted that it is unnatural to think of an accident as an
active employment of force against another.' 62 The Court therefore found
that the phrase implies a higher mens rea requirement than negligent or
accidental conduct. 63 The Court therefore held that Leocal's DUI offense
is not a crime of violence under § 16(a). 164
The Court noted that the definition is more broad under § 16(b), but
still held that Leocal's DUI offense is not a crime of violence under this
provision. 165 This provision covers offenses whereby an offender acts in
disregard of the risk that force will be used against a victim in furtherance
of his crime. 166 The Court noted that the classic example of this type of
crime is burglary.' 67  DUI is distinguished from burglary because, in
burglary, an offender disregards a substantial risk that he will use force
against a victim in furtherance of his crime. 68  The Court used a
construction identical to that employed in their analysis of § 16(a) and
found that a mens rea higher than accidental or negligent conduct as to the
risk of the use of force is necessary for the classification of a crime of
violence under § 16(b).
169
The Court also looked at the ordinary meaning of the term "crime of
violence." The Court found that this term, in addition to the use of physical
force against another that is emphasized in § 16, refers to "violent, active
crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses."' 70 The Court
further noted that this construction is in accordance with INA § 101(h),
which lists an injury-causing DUI offense' 7 1 separately from a crime of
'60 Id. at 18.









170 Id. at 18.
171 INA § 10(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(h)(3) (2000).
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violence defined by § 16.172 If § 16's definition of crime of violence
encompassed DUI offenses, INA § 101(h)(3) would be devoid of
significance.173 Therefore, DUI is not a crime of violence.
1 74
Finally, the Court briefly noted that this case did not present the
question of whether an offense requiring a mens rea of recklessness
qualified as a crime of violence under § 16.175 The Supreme Court
construed the question presented very narrowly, only addressing the mens
rea requirement with respect to the "active application of force against
another." Even then, the Court tied its holding only to crimes with no mens
rea component or a mens rea of negligence. 76  Therefore, the Court
resolved the circuit split only with regard to the narrow area of DUI
offenses whereby a drunk driver negligently disregards the risk that force
will be applied against a victim.
IV. CASE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft.
By virtue of the plain language of § 16 and the legislative history
surrounding the implementation of the definition of a crime of violence,
Congress made it clear that § 16 was intended to cover only offenses that
carry some specific intent, or risk of specific intent, to use force in
commission of a crime. Because DUI offenses with a mens rea of
negligence are committed with no specific intent to cause harm, the Court
correctly determined that they cannot be appropriately considered crimes of
violence.
However, the Court construed its holding to cover only those offenses
that could be committed with either no mens rea component or a mens rea
of negligence as to the risk that force will be used in the commission of the
crime. The Court's failure to address the mens rea of recklessness as to the
risk of force leaves open an important and related question: Does reckless
driving constitute a crime of violence under § 16?
172 INA § IO(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1 1O1(h)(2)).
173 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 18.
174 id.




A. POTENTIAL SOURCE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITED
ANALYSIS: TRYING TO SIDESTEP THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT OPINION OF TRINIDAD-AQUINO
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Trinidad-
Aquino is relevant to the analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Leocal.177 The Leocal Court stated that the case at hand did not require that
the Court address the question of whether the mens rea of recklessness was
sufficient to qualify as a crime of violence under § 16.178 The Court
acknowledged that drunk driving is a widespread problem but claimed that
the importance of the ramifications of the offense did not warrant extending
its analysis.'
79
The Supreme Court erred with respect to that decision. Because of the
importance of the classification of crimes of violence on alien deportability,
the Court should have attempted to eliminate as much ambiguity as
possible. The Court should have extended the analysis to crimes committed
with a mens rea of recklessness because the reasoning is the same as the
reasoning behind the Court's decision to exclude crimes committed with a
mens rea of negligence. By failing to extend its analysis to crimes with a
mens rea of reckless, the Court did not cure the faulty reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit in Trinidad-Aquino. In fact, the Court may have refrained
from answering the question because the proper determination would have
been at odds with the Ninth Circuit decision.
In Trinidad-Aquino, the court reached the proper conclusion that DUI
was not a crime of violence under § 16, but incorrectly based its holding on
the narrow conclusion that statutes that could be satisfied by crimes
committed with a mens rea of negligence would not constitute crimes of
violence. 180 The court correctly analyzed the inclusion of the word "use" in
the definition of a crime of violence but only held that the term required
some type of volitional conduct not present in DUI offenses."' The court
did not construe its holding on the mens rea requirement as to the risk of
intentional force, but, rather, made a blanket statement that all crimes
carrying only a mens rea of negligence could not be considered crimes of
violence. 1
82
The Ninth Circuit's decision is problematic because the court based its
holding on the mens rea needed for the entire commission of the crime.
177 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
178 Leocal, 543 U.S. at 122.
179 Id.
180 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
181 United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1444 (9th Cir. 2001).
182 Id. at 1145.
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This is particularly evident in the case of DUL. The court assumes that the
crime of DUI could be satisfied with a mens rea of negligence because the
intoxicated driver may be unaware of the risk of harm. However, as Judge
Kozinski accurately points out in his dissenting opinion in Trinidad-Aquino,
the drunk driver acts recklessly in the commission of DUI. 183 The dangers
of drunk driving are widely-known and well-documented. 184 If one defines
the mens rea of the crime with regard to the mens rea of the conduct as
opposed to the mens rea of the desired result, one could easily conclude that
DUI encompasses a reckless mental state.
8 5
It is also useful to note that in analyzing the commission of a crime
under the Model Penal Code section 208, intoxication is one of the two
areas that will be subjected to an imputed mens rea regardless of the mens
rea that the offender actually possessed.186 Thus, if recklessness establishes
an element of the offense, even where the actor is unaware of a risk because
of intoxication that he would have been aware of while sober, this
unawareness is immaterial under the Model Penal Code. 187 Despite the fact
that intoxication is voluntary, the drunk driver is not aware of the risk of
causing harm and thus not reckless in that regard, he will still be presumed
to have acted recklessly.' 8  The reasoning behind this imputation is the fact
that the offender recklessly became intoxicated and took the risk of doing
something harmful in that state of mind; this is enough to establish a mens
rea of recklessness for the entire commission of the crime.189
B. THE ERROR OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT: TRYING TO SIDESTEP ITS
PRECEDENT OF INS V. PARK
The Trinidad-Aquino court was forced to tailor its question very
narrowly in order to avoid complicating its previous holding in INS v.
Park.'90  In Park, the Ninth Circuit was asked whether involuntary
manslaughter under California law constitutes a crime of violence and thus
an aggravated felony for which an alien is deportable.' 91
183 Id. at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
186 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 871-72 (2001) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 208 (1985)).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
190 See Park v. INS, 252 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (validity questioned but not explicitly
overruled).
'9' Id. at 1020.
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Park was a native citizen of South Korea who entered the United
States as a student and became an ordained minister. 92 In May 1996, Park
pled guilty and was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for involvement
in the battery and subsequent death of a woman during a religious
ceremony to exorcise demons. 
193
The defendant argued that the definition under § 16(b) requires that
there be a substantial risk that physical force may be used intentionally in
the course of committing the offense, an element not present in cases of
involuntary manslaughter. 194 The court rejected this argument on the basis
that the court had already determined that a reckless mens rea was sufficient
for satisfaction of the § 16(b) definition. 195 Although the court specifically
acknowledged that its holding that involuntary manslaughter can constitute
a crime of violence does not render all crimes of recklessness crimes of
violence, it reaffirmed and emphasized the point that the intentional use of
physical force is not required.
196
By holding that no intent element was necessary for a crime of
violence, the court was confronted with the difficulty of trying to
distinguish the DUI offenses that later appear before the court. Again, as
Judge Kozinski noted in his Trinidad-Aquino dissenting opinion, the
majority in that decision made a very strained, and perhaps unsuccessful,
attempt to distinguish Trinidad-Aquino from Park.
197
Rather than focusing the distinction on the fact that DUI offenses
could be satisfied with a mens rea of negligence (which could arguably also
be said of the underlying facts in the Park case), the Ninth Circuit should
have used the emergence of the DUI issue to clarify and correct its previous
analysis. Prior to the DUI cases, fashioning a blanket statement that
specific intent to use force is not necessary seemed to cause no problems in
determining whether other crimes satisfy the § 16 crime of violence
definition. Notably, the blanket statement does not affect the classic
example of a reckless crime as a crime of violence. 198  However, a
clarification regarding the specific intent to use force is necessary in this
case; accordingly, the Supreme Court should have taken the lead in refining
this analysis, by which the Ninth Circuit would then have been bound.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1021.
195 id. at 1023-24.
196 Id. at 1022.
197 Id.
198 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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C. THE CORRECT DETERMINATION
199
The Supreme Court should have concluded that specific intent to use
physical force under § 16(a) or the substantial risk of the specific intent to
use physical force under § 16(b) is necessary to determine that an offense
qualifies a crime of violence under § 16. It is important to note that framing
the crime of violence analysis in this manner would not upset the
involuntary manslaughter determination as a crime of violence in Park nor
the determination that DUI is not a crime of violence under Leocal.
The most difficult distinction to make, of course, stems from the Park
scenario. In that case, the main distinction comes from the fact that the
intent element is relevant not to the result but to the conduct surrounding
the result. This means that in cases of involuntary manslaughter, it does not
matter that the offender does not intend the result. It is enough that the
offender intended the physical force which brought about the result. This
analysis creates two types of involuntary manslaughter offenses: one in
which the offender either uses intentional force or has a risk of using
intentional force, and the other in which there is neither use of intentional
force nor a risk of the use of intentional force.2°°
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DISTINCTION-THE NEED TO EXCLUDE
RECKLESS DRIVING AS A CRIME OF VIOLENCE
The importance of holding that a crime of violence requires either the
use or the risk of use of intentional force is that it makes clear that crimes
which are satisfied with a mens rea of recklessness as to the risk of use of
force are not covered under § 16's crime of violence definition, a question
left unclear after the Supreme Court's Leocal decision. Failure to address
this question leaves open the issue of whether felony reckless driving
constitutes a crime of violence under § 16.
199 For additional comments analyzing the topic of DUI as a crime of violence, see
generally Kathleen O'Rourke, Deportability, Detention and Due Process: An Analysis of
Recent Tenth Circuit Decisions in Immigration Law, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 353 (2002); Mark
Bradford, Note and Comment, Deporting Nonviolent Aliens: Misapplication of 18 U.S.C. §
16(B) to Aliens Convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 901 (2003);
Lauren K. Lofton, Note, Drunk Driving and Deportation-Should DUI Convictions Be
Treated as Crimes of Violence for Removal Purposes? 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 591 (2003); Julie
Anne Rah, Note, The Removal of Aliens who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as a Crime of
Violence Under § 18 U.S.C. 16(b), 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2109 (2002); Michael G. Salemi,
Comment, DUI as a Crime of Violence Under § 18 U.S.C. § 16(b): Does a Drunk Driver
Risk "Using" Force? 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 691 (2002).
200 Note that the inclusion of some types of involuntary manslaughter does not change
the analysis under DCRP. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 96
LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT
Reckless driving is a serious issue facing the United States. Reckless
driving is defined as the "driv[ing] [of] any vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property .... ,201 The base charge of
reckless driving, like DUI, is a misdemeanor. Misdemeanors are not
considered aggravated felonies, and thus are not deportable offenses. The
exception, however, occurs when bodily injury results, elevating
misdemeanor DUI and reckless driving charges to felonies. °2 Reckless
driving, therefore, is essentially the "sober equivalent" of DUI and is treated
accordingly. It is illogical that under the post-Leocal state of the law, DUI
offenses are excluded as crimes of violence because offenders are too
intoxicated to consciously disregard risk, yet felony reckless driving
offenses are not. It is important that this unsound result be rectified.
This importance is evident when examining the Third Circuit's
decision in Oyebanji v. Gonzales. °3 In Oyebanji, the defendant was a
lawful permanent resident from Nigeria.20 4 In February 1998, Oyebanji
pled guilty to vehicular homicide and DUI (under New Jersey state law) for
causing a car accident that killed another person.20 5
An immigration judge ordered her removal on the basis that the
vehicular homicide conviction constituted an aggravated felony.20 6 The
Third Circuit, therefore, was faced with the question of whether vehicular
homicide under New Jersey state law constituted a crime of violence as was
necessary for an aggravated felony. The New Jersey state law in question
required proof of recklessness in satisfying a vehicular homicide
conviction.27 Noting that the Leocal court failed to determine whether an
offense that requires proof of the reckless use of force qualifies as a crime
of violence, the court was faced with "decid[ing] the very question that the
Leocal Court did not reach.,
20 8
The Oyebanji court focused on the reasoning underlying the Leocal
decision and suggested that the crime in question did not constitute a crime
of violence under the Supreme Court reasoning. The court based this
201 UNIF. VEHICLE CODE § 11-901(a) (2004).
202 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.377(2) (2005) ("Reckless driving is a Category B
Felony if it involved willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property that
resulted in either death or substantial bodily injury.").
203 Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
204 Id. at 261.
205 Id. at 262.
206 Id.
207 "Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a
vehicle or vessel recklessly." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-5(a) (2005); see State v. Stanton, 820
A.2d 637 (N.J. 2003).
218 Oyebanji, 418 F.3d at 263.
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finding on the Supreme Court's reliance on the ordinary meaning of the
term "use" as requiring active employment of force and the Court's
suggestion that accidental crimes fall outside the reach of § 16.209 The
Oyebanji court also found it persuasive, as did the Supreme Court, that
section 101(h) of the INA separately lists a crime of violence from the
crime of reckless driving and DUI as a serious criminal offense.
210
The Oyebanji court reached the proper decision that crimes committed
without a risk of the intentional use of force are not crimes of violence.
However, by not explicitly addressing this question, the Supreme Court left
the area open to error and allowed the possibility of another circuit court
split. If this case had occurred in the Ninth Circuit, for instance, it is quite
possible that, based on the Court's holding in Park, the case would have
come out differently. It is plausible that the Ninth Circuit would have
decided that, because there is no specific intent requirement for a crime of
violence in that circuit, reckless driving that results in the death or serious
injury of another constitutes a crime of violence.
As we have seen in the case history of DUI offenses, circuit court
splits result in disparate treatment of aliens and make the law awkward and
confusing. Because of the importance of these laws and the ramifications
of crime of violence convictions on aliens, the Supreme Court should have
done everything in its power to eliminate possible circuit court splits that
could arise in the future. Furthermore, the reasoning employed by the court
could have easily been extended to exclude crimes committed with a mens
rea of recklessness as to the use of force. This would have clearly excluded
reckless driving as a crime of violence, thus clarifying any potential
ambiguities.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft,
but failed to extend its analysis far enough. By failing to address whether
offenses that require proof of the reckless use of force against a person or
property of another constitute crimes of violence, the Supreme Court did
not cure the faulty Ninth Circuit decision in Trinidad-Aquino and left open
the determination of whether reckless driving may constitute a crime of
violence. Such determinations have significant ramifications on the
209 Id.
210 Id. at 264. The definition of "serious criminal offense" under the INA includes, "any
crime of violence as defined in section 16 of title 18 of the United States Code; or any crime
of reckless driving, or driving while intoxicated under the influence of alcohol or of
prohibited substances if such crime involves personal injury to another." INA § 10(h)(3), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
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treatment of lawful resident aliens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court could
have extended the reasoning to exclude acts committed with a mens rea of
recklessness as to the use of force. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
have specified that crimes of violence require a specific intent to use force.
Maria-Teresa Davenport
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